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Neo-Functionalism  Reassessed: Suggesting a Synthesis of European Integration
Theory
Abstract
How are we to understand processes of European integration? There are a
number of theories that attempt to shed-light on the integration process
each considering that a particular variant of social existence provides the
best means of interpretation. Intergovernmentalism proposes that the only
way to understand European integration is thr ugh the actions of nation-
states. Neo-functionalism emphasises the role of sectors and sub-national
actors in the international economy and the extent to which a
supranational authority would engender economic benefit and political
acceptance of the process. Consequently, these factors add impetus to
further integration in other sectors until a single economy emerges.
Indeed, these general theories provide the basis for two models of
governance at the European Union (EU) level. State-c ntricism adheres to
intergovernmental understandings of European integration and multilevel
governance elements of both neo-functional and intergovernmental
propositions. Through a study of the insurance industry this paper
investigates the extent of sector involvement in EU decision-making and in
doing so, analyses the utilisation of sub-national actors, supranationality
and spillover in the process of European integration.
Introduction
This paper explores whether the intergovernmental approach and state-centric governance
are able to fully explain European integration. Because of the historical changes during
the 1980s and 1990s this paper argues that if European integration is to be fully
understood a reassessment of neo-functionalism is necessary.
In the aftermath of the Single European Act (SEA), the Single European Market (SEM)
and the initiation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), it became evident that
financial service industries needed to involve themselves in the creation of the European
Union (EU). Consequently, through an empirical study of the European insurance
industry this paper investigates the extent of sector involvement in the European decision-
making process, and in doing so, analyses neo-functionalism i tergovernmentalism, state-
centric and multilevel governance. The empirical study incorporates an interview
programme with individuals involved in the creation of insurance legislation (these
include, interest group representatives, Commission representatives, Permanent
Representatives and national officials). Through the interviews a model is constructed
and a generalisation relating to spillover is posited.
Theories of European Integration
During the 1960s neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism were the two main
contending European integration theories and by the 1970s it seemed that
intergovernmentalism  provided the most appropriate interpretation. However, the 1980s
and 1990s saw a resurgence in European integration and this paper argues that because of
the renewed effort to create a European common market, attention needed to be turned
toward neo-functionalism. “The Single European Act led to a revival of neo-functionalist
explanations . . .” with regard to European integration (George, 1994; p 1). Indeed, some
considered that the abandonment of neo-functionalism “. . . left the study of European
integration in a theoretical void . . . however, neo-functional concepts are again appearing
in the writings of some EC-specialists” (Tranhome-Mikkelsen, 1991; p 2).
Pederson (1992) argued that in ergovernmentalism should be combined with elements of
neo-functionalism to enable a new framework of analysis. Keoh ne and Hoffman (1990;
1991) emphasised the pooling of sovereignty rather than its transference from the
Member States to supranational institutions. A firmer intergovernmental stance was taken
by Moravcsik (1991; 1993) whose analysis of the SEA considered that the dynamics of
European integration resides with the Member States alone. A more neo-functional
perspective (omitting spillover) is taken by Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) who contended
that three groups reshaped the EU: industrial elite  (sub-national actors), EU institutions
(supranationality) and Member State governments (intergovernmentalism). Furthermore,
Sandholtz (1994) investigates why Member States were prepared to give up their
currencies and the sovereignty this entails. He contended that membership of the EU
defines preference parameters and decisions. That intergovernmentalism alone failed to
explain the impact that membership of the EU had on Member State prefer nces, interests
and demands.
Kirchner (1992) argued that neither neo-functionalism nor intergove nmentalism
adequately captured “. . . the existing overlap in decision-making between national and
Community authorities, the sharing of joint tasks and interests, and the fusion of
competencies between the national and Community level” (p 35). Indeed, if European
integration was to be fully understood a combination of approaches was necessary. This
is a theme that has also been posited by Garrett and Tsebelis (1996), Gehring (1996),
George (1994; 1995), Richardson (1996), Tranholme-Mikkelsen (1991), Ugur (1997).
Fundamentally, the practicalities of being involved in the EU and the theoretical literature
identify that intergovernmentalism alone is no longer an adequate explanation of
European integration. This paper undertakes an empirical analysis to determine the
validity of this claim.
Intergovernmentalism, State-Centricism and European Integration
Moravcsik (1991) denied neo-functionalism and argued that the primary source of
European integration resided with the Member States and the influence they wield in
Brussels. In a later work he took this argument further and attempted to illustrate the
limitations of neo-functionalism by presenting a theory of liberal intergov rnmentalism
(Moravcsik, 1993).
Garrett and Tsebelis (1996) argued that intergovernmentalism “. . . tended to focus on the
bargaining between national governments over the outcome of treaty negotiations. The
epochs that treaties demarcate are considered a function of governments’ preferences and
their ability to further those preferences in inter-state bargaining” (p 269). Following the
SEA and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) intergovernmentalists started to look at the
mechanics of EU decision-making. However, analysis concentrated on the Council of
Ministers and most studies that “. . . focus exclusively on dynamics within the Council of
Ministers are likely to misperceive most policy dynamics” (ibid p 293). There are two
main problems with the intergovernmental approach: first, an analysis of treaty
bargaining only scratches the surface of the process of European integration; secondly, it
considers that all decisions are created and made in the Council of Ministers. Both of
these problems stem from intergovernmentalism's fundamental premise that “ . . . all
decisions are products of bargaining among nations” (ibid, p 294).
Intergovernmentalism underpins the state-centric model. This argues that the “. . . overall
direction of policy making is consistent with state control” (Hooghe and Marks, 1997; p
22). Furthermore, “(s)tate-centrists contend that EU membership preserves or even
strengthens state sovereignty and that European integration is driven by bargains among
member-state governments” (ibid, p 21). However, if the state-centric model is the
dominant means of decision-making in the EU, three conditions would need to hold:
Member State representatives in the Council of Ministers should be able to impose their
understandings and preferences on other European institutions; Member States should
always be sovereign in relation to the EU; Member States should be able to control sub-
national interests (Hooghe and Marks, 1997).
Neo-functionalism , Multi-Level Governance and European Integration
Haas (1958) provided an outline of neo-functionalism. Political parties and interest
groups accept that action should be taken at the supranational level. Interest groups and
political parties organise and function beyond the nation-state and define their interests in
the new environment. Interest groups and political parties through their interaction sow
the seeds of ideological agreement which overtake those based at the national level. There
is an adherence to the rule of law by the parties involved and when decisions are opposed
dissatisfactions are channelled through legal avenues rather than through aggression or
ignoring the situation. Fundamentally Haas provides an analysis of the process and
progression of European integration through supranationality, sub-national actors and
spillover. For further discussions relating to neo-functionalism, in ergovernmentalism and
European integration see George (1994, 1995); Haas (1958, 1964, 1968, 1971, 1975,
1976); Heathcote (1966);  Keohane and Nye (1990); Keohane and Hoffman (1990, 1991);
Lindberg (1963 1967); Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, 1971); Nye (1971); Sandholtz
and Zysman (1989); Sandholtz, (1994); Puchalla (1972); Rees (1992); Tranholme-
Mikkelsen (1991); Wallace (1990).
Petersen (1995) considered that “. . . he gap remains wide between theoretical models
which seek to explain broad patterns of European integration and those which seek to
explain the EU's policy-making process” (p 69) However, the debate has turned toward
governance through the arguments initiated by Keohane and Hoffman (1991), Marks
(1993), Marks (1995) and Marks et al  (1996; 1996a).
Hooghe and Marks (1997) link neo-functionalism (through supranational and sub-
national actors) to multilevel governance and intergovernmentalism to state-centric
governance. They conclude that the state-centric approach is not able of to fully explain
European policy making processes; that EU decision-making and policy-making are of a
multilevel nature. Multi-level governance recognises the role played by Member States in
the decision-making process but argues that elements of control have been passed over to
supranational institutions. However, if the multilevel governance model is to be accepted
a number of premises must hold. Initially the main supranational institutions (European
Parliament and the Commission) should share authority with the Council of Ministers.
Secondly, individual Member State executives should be unable to continually stamp
their authority on collective decision-making. And finally “. . . that sub-national interests
mobilise directly in the European arena” (ibid, p 24).
Supranationality, and Sub-National Actors
Haas (1958) outlined his concept of supranationality and argued that sub-national actors
“. . . in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations
and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (p 16). Heathcote (1966) identified
supranationality as “. . . an academic notion-predicted rather than experienced, and to be
arrived at after a process of evolution” (p 162). Supranationality affects the process of
decision-making as it evolves.
Supranationality is not the antithesis of intergovernmentalism, but “. . . a cumulative
pattern of accommodation in which the participants refrain from unconditionally vetoing
and instead seek to attain agreement by means of compromises upgrading common
interests”(Haas, 1964a; pp 64-66). Indeed, structurally it encompassed “. . . the existence
of governmental authorities closer to the archetype of federation than any past
international organisation but not yet identical with it” (Haas, 1958; p 59). What it will
become is unclear. Supranationality is a process rather than an end and this may be
identified by the on going accumulation of European treaties and their integrative affects.
This paper considers that supranationality has two levels of epistemology; on the one
hand, it is material in that it is the decision-making institutions in existence at a given
time; while on the other, it is part of the abstract process of European integration.
Sub-National Actors and Supranationality: An Empirical Inquiry
To identify whether interactions between supranational institutions and sub-national
actors exist a series of interviews were undertaken with individuals involved in  EU
decision-making regarding insurance legislation. The interviews at the both the EU and
UK level provide information that may allow the work to deduce a similar process among
most Member States.
The individuals interviewed were representatives from the following institutions.
Directorate-Generale XV (DG XV) (Finance).
The Council Permanent Representative for UK in Finance.
The Department of Industry and Trade (DTI).
Committee for European Assurance (CEA). Paris and Brussels.
Bureau International des Producteurs d’Assurance & de Reassurance  (BIPAR).
Association of British Insurers (ABI).
British Insurers International Committee (BIIC)
Irish Insurance Federation (IIF).
Council Permanent Representative for France in Finance.
The interviews were conducted on a semi-formal basis and centred round 12 core
questions, these were:
(1) What are the major functions of the CEA/BIPAR/ABI/the Commission/the
Council/National Supervisors and how do these fit with each other at;
(A) The EU level.
(B) The national level.
(2) To what extent are decisions made with interest
group/COREPER/Commission/National Supervisor in-put.
(3) Is it interest groups, national supervisors, the Council of Ministers or the Commission
that define decision parameters.
(4) Does the Council, the Commission, national legislatures and interest groups reach a
compromise prior to a decision reaching the Council.
(5) Does an interaction exist between the Council/the Commission/national supervisors
and specific interest groups at a national and European level.
(6) How does the Council/national supervisor know what to insist upon in respect of
national interest.
(7) Does an interaction exist between interest groups/Commission/Council/national
supervisor and the Insurance Committee
(8) Are different Member States looking for  specific types of life insurance regulatory
environments for the SEM which is different from other member states.
(9) Are there differences between the;
(a) The French ideal
(b) The German  ideal
(c) The Dutch  ideal
(d) The UK  ideal
(e) The Italian  ideal
Please illustrate these differences.
How does your market ideal fit into these?
(10) Is a compromise reached between the different national interest groups prior to the
Commission initially drawing up draft legislation or is there an interaction between the
interest group at the European level and the Commission which takes into consideration
a compromise reached by the member state interest groups i.e. ABI through membership
of the European interest group CEA/BIPAR.
(11) Where possible have compromises been reached between the Council, the
Commission and Parliament before the final negotiations to enable a more efficient
means of decision-making?
(12) What takes precedence in the formulation of a Directive Member State or sector
interests?
The Interview Results
In general, the interviewees acknowledged that many influences went into the drafting of
a directive. Since 1988, interaction between industries and the Commission had become
more routine. The representative of DG XV considered that ongoing contact with the
insurance industry was imperative to legislative input. Most importantly, the interviews
illustrate the interactory procedures at work within the creation of legislation and the
extent interest groups were used in the process. An understanding of the interviews is
illustrated in the Decision-Making Model (see Fig One).
At the European level, there is an interaction between the interests of the different
Member State industries and the interests of the European institutions. The interviews
indicated that a compromise is reached at the European interest group level through the
industries interacting both with one another and with the Commission and Parliament.
The proposed legislation that goes through to the Council has been agreed by the Member
State sectors/industries who either progressively or subsequently inform their own
government of the agreed legislation. This indicates elements of neo-functionalism and a
multilevel governance approach. However, during the process there may be
disagreements between the Council and the other institutions. This identifies an
interaction between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism and provides an
example of multilevel rather than state-centric governance.
Once the draft legislation is in the realms of the Council, certain agreements may be
disposed of, this highlights intergovernmentalism and the state-centric approach.
However, it was expected that the main tenets of the legislation would become law
because the national sectors/industries would have compromised their positions at an
earlier stage (neo-functionalism). Consequently, one would have expected them to lobby
their government to accept the proposed legislation (intergovernmentalism/neo-
functionalism).
The European Decision-Making Model
There are a number of issues that need to be explained regarding the model. First, the
interviews indicated that national interest groups were affiliated to interest groups at the
EU level (mainly the CEA and BIPAR). Secondly, in the formulation of legislation
(although Member State interest groups may approach the European institutions), the
Commission and European Parliament preferred to deal with European interest groups.
These provide a European overview of the situation. Thirdly, because the sector
understands what is necessary for the successful operation of the embryonic regulatory
environment, it is reasonable that they would confer and reach some agreement prior to
Council or intergovernmental interference. Finally, the interviews with the CEA, the ABI,
the BIIC and members of EU decision-making institutions substantiated that  Member
State insurance industries, through interest groups, actively participate in the formulation
of EU legislation.
FIG 1
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There are two general directions that could be taken regarding decision- making
procedures identified on the model (see Fig One). These are indicated by arrows A and B;
process A considers that demands are formulated through the national legislature prior to
formulation at the EU level, whereas route B illustrates demand formulation being
compromised at the EU level prior to the involvement of the national legislature. Route A
identifies a more cogent intergovernmental approach whereas route B illustrates more of
a neo-functional process. Of course, the situation is not as clear-cut as depicted and
elements of both routes were in use, but in general the interviews emphasised route B.
Furthermore, the European interest group rarely had any dealings with the national
legislature and interaction between the two was undertaken between the national interest
group and the national governmental departments (the DTI in the UK). At this point there
is intergovernmental involvement but in most cases the DTI adheres to compromises
already made at the European interest group level. More importantly, there is
intergovernmental involvement through the Council. However, since the establishment of
the SEA and Maastricht, in certain areas, this has diminished.
Spillover
Another central idea to the concept of neo-functionalism is spillover. This is where
integration in one industry/sector creates its own impetus and necessitates further
integration both in the same, and in other industries/sectors. “Specifically, the term
spillover describes the accretion of new powers and tasks to a central institutional
structure, based on changing demands and the expectation on the part of such political
actors as interest groups, political parties and bureaucracies” (Haas, cited in Kirchner,
1976; p 3).  Effectively, there is an interplay between spillov r and supranationality in
that the “. . . establishment of supranational institutions designed to deal with functionally
specific tasks will set in motion economic, social and political processes which generate
pressures towards further integration” (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991; p 4).
With the intensification of the integration process in Europe, the spill v r process and the
supranational composition of the EU is more identifiable than ever. Helen Wallace (1990)
considers that due to the internal market programme, “. . . the neo-functionalist concept of
spillover is now being vindicated” (p 219).
Spillover is the means by which European integration is achieved. It is where co-
operation in one sphere spills into another. Legislation in one sector creates the need for
legislation in other sectors and/or further legislation in different areas of the same sector.
In this context, the establishment of a SEM  was not an end in itself but a stage in the
spillover process. However, the extent to which changing incentives created by spillover
allowed an explanation for European integration has been a point of contention. Nye
(1971) argued that the functional linkage of tasks has been a less dynamic aspect of
European integration than was originally believed to be the case. Indeed, Lindberg and
Scheingold (1970) wished to deny that spillover led to the Common Market.  Keohane
and Hoffman (1990) provide a more sophisticated understanding of ‘spillover’ one that
interacts between domains and sectors1. They argue that successful spillover necessitates
prior agreements among Member States in terms of the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty
etc.
Spillover, Financial Services and European Integration
This next stage of this paper argues that through the above understanding of the EU
decision-making process spillover is identifiable in European integration. It generalises
the processes identified by the interviews and extends the model and its theoretical
implications. Usually, a qualitative analysis generalises from one situation to another
similar situation, rather than from a sample population to the total population.
Consequently, this paper posits that, the process taking place regarding insurance is likely
to be happening from industry to industry and from sector to sector (Glaser and Strauss,
1967; Glaser, 1978; Charmaz, 1983; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Corbin and
Strauss, 1990; Glaser, 1992; Strauss and Corbin, 1994). Indeed, these methodologists
consider that substantive theory may be constructed in relation to pre-existing formal
theories. Moving from descriptive theory to abstract theory through ver denser data and
logical generalisation.
                                                 
1 The difference between domains and sectors could be perceived as the difference between
intergovernmental spillover (domain) and neo-functional spillover (sector). This paper attempts takes this
idea further by considering intergovernmental spillover and different forms of neo-functional spillover.
Industries and sectors are isolated entities concerned with their own situation in the wider
market place. However, it is through this self interest that they must be aware of what is
happening in other industries and sectors this in turn makes them initiators and reactors to
the actions of other industries and sectors. Sectors and industries need to involve
themselves in the European integration process. They need to ensure their competitive
advantage and this means participating in the European decision-making process.
Fundamentally, they are the instigators of changes in legislation in both their own and
similar industries/sectors. Indeed, on occasion they pressure their Member State
governments to bring about new treaties.
There are two main understandings of spillover outlined in this paper:
(a) Spillover occurs because of the impact it has on differentiated actors, including
multinationals, interest groupings, the Commission and national organisations. These
actors form coalitions to increase EU decision-making in new sectors and enhance
integration in sectors where agreements have already been reached.
(b) Spillover is a result of past policies created by Member States. They remain central to
the integration process and continue to make crucial policy decisions in the EU. (Member
States remain central actors but they are dictated to by past actions).
It is possible to build on the above definitions of spillover and devises a model to
illustrate how it is at work in the process of European integration. Spillover may be
observed in legislation specific to the insurance industry (vertical neo-functional
spillover); between legislation in the services sector e.g. between insurance, banking,
pensions etc. (horizontal specific neo-functional spill ver); and between sectors e.g.
services and capital (horizontal general neo-functional spillover). The paper also
recognises that an intergovernmental process of spillover is at work within European
integration in the guise of the treaties and there outcomes. Indeed, “. . . spillover requires
prior programmatic agreement among governments, expressed in an intergovernmental
bargain. Such a bargain is clearly important in accounting for the Single European Act”
(Keohane and Hoffman, 1991; p 17). This is spillover from treaty to treaty which may be
labelled intergovernmental spillover and is indicated by definition (b) above. However,
wider transnational processes are also providing an impetus for European integration. In
this context, the paper contends that intergovernmental spillover is usually confined to
providing the environment for further neo-functional spillover (vertical or horizontal) to
take place. This is illustrated by definition (a) above. Fundamentally, one may posit, that
there is an interaction between neo-functional and intergovernmental spillover which
enhances and deepens European integration.
The Spillover Model (Figs Two and Three) outlines the above interactions:
intergovernmental spillover is indicated in the left hand column and is made up of
intergovernmental agreements and neo-functional spillover is illustrated on the right hand
side of the model. As explained above, neo-functional spillover constitutes three
processes and the figures attempt to clarify two of these. The crosses on the model
represent pieces of legislation that have been passed in relation to the treaties that existed
at that time e.g. X1 relates to the Reinsurance Directive and X2 the Co-insurance
Directive etc.
The liberalisation of insurance, banking and capital markets is tied closely to the free
movements of capital. Indeed, the treaties designate that the liberalisation of the
banking and insurance sectors “. . . shall be effected in step with the progressive
liberalisation of the movement of capital” (HMSO, 1988; Art 61). This article could
be seen as intergovernmental spillover which provides an opportunity for general
horizontal neo-functional spillover (sector to sector or services to capital) and specific
horizontal neo-functional spil over (industry to industry or banking to insurance) and
vertical spillover (within the same industry i.e. insurance). This could be seen as an
example of intergovernmental spillover providing the initial impetus for further neo-
functional spillover.
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Horizontal Specific Spillover (Industry to Industry Within the Same Sector)
X1. Re-insurance Directive 64/225/EEC
X2. Co-insurance Directive 78/473/EEC
X3. First Life Insurance Directive. 79/267/EEC
X4. Second Life Insurance Directive. 90/ 619/EEC
X5. Third Life Insurance Directive. 92/96/EEC
X6. First Non-Life Insurance Directive. 73/239/EEC
X7. Second Non-Life Insurance Directive. 88/357/EEC
X8. Third Non-Life Insurance Directive. 92/49/EEC
X9. First Banking Directive. 77/780/EEC
X10. Second Banking Directive. 89/646/EEC
X11. Capital Adequacy Directive. 93/6/EEC
X12. Solvency Ration Directive. 94/7/EEC
X13. Accounts Directive for Banks and Other Credit Institutions. 86/635/EEC
X14. Directive Concerning Equal Treatment for Men and Women in Occupational
Social Security Schemes. 86/378/EEC
X15. Directive Concerning the Rights of Residence for S lf-Employed Persons Who
have Ceased Occupational Activity. 90/365/EEC
European Insurance Legislation
Insurance legislation is an example of vertical neo-functional spillover or spillover within
the same industry. Initially, there were two general programmes proposed to ensure that
both the freedom of services and establishment would be realised in life insurance by the
beginning of 1970. This was indicated through five main bi-annual target dates.
1964 Reinsurance. Freedom of establishment and services.
1966 Indemnity insurance. Fre dom of establishment.
1968 Life insurance. Freedom of establishment.
1968 Indemnity insurance.  Freedom of services.
1970 Life insurance. Freedom of services.
As may be observed, life insurance was to be harmonised in two stages which would have
corresponded with the initial plans for EMU. However, international and internal
pressures had not demanded intergovernmental spillover and the necessary environment
for adherence to the above timetable. This gradually changed and because of international
and Member State competitive pressures, between the 1970s and 1990s, the environment
was transformed. During the 1970s mutual trust between Member States kept the
harmonisation of substantive law to a minimum. The 1980s realised the SEA, QMV and
co-operation procedure and the 1990s witnessed co-decision procedure the Maastricht
Treaty and EMU. Indeed, during the 1980s and 1990s intergovernmental spillover
provided the environment for the successful completion of the above programmes (see
Fig 2 X1 to X8).
In its proposal for a the Third Life Assurance Directive, the Commission emphasised that
“. . . the internal market in insurance represents a primary goal . . . in view of the
importance of this strongly expanding sector”2. The insurance industry considered that it
needed priority treatment because it lagged behind the liberalisation of the other
economic sectors within the financial services sector (omitting pensions). Directives in
securities and banking had already been implemented and as a consequence the insurance
industry had been left at a competitive disadvantage in relation to these industries. Indeed,
an example of horizontal specific neo-functional spill ver (within the same sector;
banking to insurance) and with regard to the  capital aspects of the legislation, horizontal
general neo-functional spil over (from sector to sector; services to capital).
In terms of vertical neo-functional spillover, the adopted insurance directives have taken
form in three generations dating from the early 1970s: these are briefly overviewed
below. Directives concentrating on more specific areas include the Council directive on
measures to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom of establishment and freedom to
provide services in respect of the activities of insurance agents and brokers (ex ISIC
group 630) and in particular, transitional measures in respect of these activities
(77/92/EEC)3. Further directives providing the infra-structure for the second generation
included the Co-Insurance Directive (78/473/EEC)4, the Credit and Suretyship Assurance
Directive amending Directive (87/343/EEC)5, and the Legal Expenses Directive
                                                 
2 Com 91 57 final SYN 329 p 2
3 OJ L 26, 31/06/77
4 OJ L 151, 07/06/84
5 OJ L 185, 04/07/87
(87/344/EEC)6. The infra-structure directives for the third generation include the Council
Directive on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts of Insurance Undertakings
(91/674/EEC)7 and the Council Directive setting up an Insurance Committee
(91/675/EEC)8. The former of these Directive (91/674/EEC) proposed the harmonisation
of EU insurance accounting practices which is necessary if valuation and solvency
indicators are to be uniform. Indeed, such is necessary if an integrated capital market is to
be achieved. And Directive (91/675/EEC) provided a committee to act as an intermediary
between the industry (sub-national actors) and the Commission and to assist in
implementation procedures. The committee also examines any questions relating to the
application of existing directives and the preparation of new legislation proposals in the
insurance sector. Indeed, this could be seen as an example of spillover and
supranationality interacting with each other (Kirc ner, 1976; Tranholm-Mikkelsen,
1991).
The Life Assurance Directives
As indicated above, the life assurance directives illustrate specific neo-functional
spillover (this is spillovers most recognisable form) with each generation creating the
need for the next. However, each generation also created the need for further legislation,
both in other areas of insurance and financial services. The first generation of directives
allowed for the freedom of establishment as long as condition of contracts and tariffs
were approved by the Member State in which the company wished to establish. Th  First
Life Assurance Directive dealt with the need for licensing and the means by which an
insurance establishment would be approved and standardised. Additionally, the
supervisory responsibility in respect of establishment competence was transferred to the
Member State where the principal place of business was situated. However, there was
                                                 
6 OJ L185, 04/07/87
7 OJ L 374,  31/12/91
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little legislation regarding freedom of services in this directive and this is what the
industry wanted.
The Second Life Assurance Directive (90/619/EEC)9 provided the means for cross-
border business and outlined the active and passive provisions of services. The directive
takes the consumer as its starting point and provides for free movement through two
regulations. If policy-holders approach an insurer from another Member State, the
legislation of the Member State where the insurer has its majority of business applies.
However, if the insurer attempts to persuade the policy-holder to take out a policy, the
legislative code of the Member State in which the insurer performs a service applies. This
aggravated cross-border trade in life insurance and necessitated further harmonisation.
This led to the Third Life Assurance Directive through elements of vertical neo-
functional spillover.
The Third Life Assurance Directive (92/96/EEC)10 was adopted on 10 November 1992
and implemented on 1 July 1994. It creates a uniform system of control in that insurers
need only to be granted approval where they have their headquarters and control should
be administered by their own Member State. It amends both former directives and
specifically removes the passive/active clause from the Second Life Assurance Directive.
In general terms, host Member State legislation only applies if it is considered to be for
the general good - this incorporates the permitted application of host country rules where
there is no duplication in the country. The general good should also be applied without
national discrimination and proportionate to the objective being pursued.
In attempting to create a European market in insurance products further directives will be
necessary and the bulk of Member State legislation harmonised. Each piece of legislation
necessitated and created the basis of the next. This process has formed the basis of the
                                                 
9 OJ L 330 29/11/90
10 OJ L 360 09/12/92
SEM’s regulatory structure  in insurance and allows an illustration of vertical neo-
functional spillover (see the Spillover Model Fig One X1 to X8)
European Banking Legislation
The banking industry has been affected by two co-ordination directives. The First
Banking Directive (77/780/EEC)11 cleared most obstacles to the freedom of
establishment for banks and other credit institutions, introduced home country
supervision and a common position for the granting of banking licences. However,
problems were still apparent and certain obstacles needed to be removed before a genuine
single market in banking could be achieved but these were taken up in the Second
Banking Directive (89/646/EEC)12. This could be considered as an example neo-
functional vertical spillover in the banking industry. Indeed, the First Banking Directives
led to calls from the insurance industry for a level playing field and the realisation of the
first generation of insurance legislation (neo-functional horizontal specific spillover X9 to
X6).
The Second Banking Directive aimed at the removal of authorisation problems i.e. 12
different supervisors, a definition of banking activities and cross-border trade.
Consequently, the second directive enabled a single banking licence, a list of banking
activities and minimum capital levels (5m ECU laid down for new banks). The directive
also provided supervisory rules in terms of internal management, audit systems and the
amount of control of major shareholders. As before this led to calls for further legislation
regarding freedom of services for insurance and the realisation of the second and third
generations of insurance directives. A further example of horizontal specific neo-
functional spillover (X10 to X7 and X8).
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The Directive on Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions (CAD)
provides the framework for the Investment Services Directive (ISD) (93/22/EEC)13. The
Commission had been pressurised by investment firms to ensure a level playing field for
investment firms and credit institutions. Indeed, the two directives provide an internal
market in respect of investment services and give all institutions, whether credit
institutions or investment firms, the ability to offer investment services throughout the
EU. This had implications for European capital markets and illustrates both vertical and
general horizontal neo-functional spillover (within the same industry and sector to sector
or services to capital). In this context, the sectors are intrinsically linked.
In general, during the nineties, there have been numerous decisions made by the
Commission and Council as well as further directives with regard to the banking sector.
For instance, Council Directive (96/13/EC)14 amends article 2 (2) of (77/780/EEC)15 in
respect of the list of permanent exclusions of certain credit institutions. Directive
(96/10/EC)16 amends directive (89/647/EEC)17 regarding contractual netting by
competent authorities; directives (95/15/EC)18 and (94/7/EC)19 amend the directive
regarding solvency ratios. Effectively, the last directive in terms of banking that was not
an amendment to a previous directive was (93/6/EC)20 which covered both investment
firms and credit institutions and subsequently both security markets and insurance as
well. However, each piece of legislation builds on the previous and extends European
integration.
Banking legislation and its consequent regulation spills over and necessitates legislation
in other financial services industries and other sectors. The in e action between capital
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markets and banking and pensions and labour. may be considered examples of neo-
functional horizontal general spillover; or spillover from sector to sector. The interaction
between banking and insurance can be perceived as an illustration of neo-functional
horizontal specific spillover; or spillover from industry to industry. Finally, vertical neo-
functional spillover  is illustrated by legislation in one area of the industry, e.g. insurance,
creating the necessity for further legislation in the same area. The non-life insurance
directives are, on the one hand, tied closely to the life insurance directives, while on the
other, like their life insurance counterparts, they border banking and security services
legislation. In this context, there has been task expansion throughout the sector and one
may consider that this encompasses the above forms of spill ver.
Conclusion
The interviews illustrate that compromise is sought and achieved at the European interest
group level through negotiations with the Commission and Parliament. Indeed, if the
legislation is being negotiated by the industry through sub-national actors (interest
groups) interacting with supranational institutions (EU decision-makers) the research has
uncovered an example of neo-functionalism. If a compromise is not reached at the EU
level, then each Member State industry would pursue its own ideal regulatory structure
and compromise would be difficult if not impossible to achieve. In achieving successful
acceptable legislation at the EU level, the interviews illustrate that both neo-functional
and intergovernmental processes need to be at work. Fundamentally, in terms of the use
of sub-national actors and supranationality, even if a total neo-functional process is not at
work, it is at least a form of multilevel governance. In many cases supranational
institutions share authority with the Council of Ministers. Individual Member State
executives are unable to continually stamp their authority on collective decision-making
and sub-national interests are active in  European integration. However, in some instances
Member State representatives in the Council of Ministers are able to impose their
understandings and preferences on other European institutions. Consequently, elements of
the state-centric model do exist in the process of European integration.
As the interviews with the CEA, the ABI, the BIIC and members of EU decision-making
institutions substantiated that Member State insurance industries actively participated in
the creation of EU legislation through interest groups. The paper accepts the European
Decision-Making Model and posits that through generalising this procedure a pill v r
process is identifiable in the EU regarding financial services legislation. If Member State
industries/sectors need to be involved in the creation of European legislation in one
context, other industries/sectors through their own self-interest are drawn into the process.
This is identifiable in the interaction between the insurance and banking industries and
the services and capital sectors. However, so as to allow neo-functional spillover t  take
place intergovernmental treaties must have ensured the necessary environment e.g. the
SEA and the SEM and the Maastricht Treaty and EMU. The timing of the process is
fundamental. Indeed, the need for further treaties may come from external (international
competitiveness) or internal forces (industries/sectors). Of course, the motives of separate
Member State governments when they involve themselves in the formulation of further
intergovernmental spillover are difficult to identify. Indeed, this is an area for further
research however, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
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